This PhD fee waiver is available only for overseas students, full-time and resident, with a start date of September 2021.

This scholarship will cover the difference between home fees and overseas fees. The home fees for 2021/22 are £4,500 and overseas fees are £17,000. Thus, the value of the fee waiver will be £12,500. The successful candidate will be liable for the home portion of fees, £4,500, which will be fixed for the duration of their programme, as well as receive a stipend of £6,000 per academic year.

Subject to satisfactory progress, the scholarship will be awarded for three years.

Successful scholars will undertake a package of training and career development opportunities. This will include a set number of hours of teaching or research assistance. The career development package will be phased in year-by-year and supported by relevant training.

Project: The Problem of Epistemic value

Supervisors: Dr Luca Moretti and Dr Federico Luzzi

Socrates, in Plato’s Dialogue Meno, famously asked why we should valuate knowledge more than mere true belief. This question has opened the ongoing philosophical debate about epistemic values. According to contemporary virtue epistemologists (e.g. Greco, Sosa and Zagzebski), knowledge is more valuable than true belief because it coincides with true belief arising from a successful exercise of the subject’s cognitive ability, or with true belief motivated by virtuous traits and dispositions of the subject. Other philosophers, however, have rejected the thesis that knowledge is an ultimate epistemic value, or the only one we have. Some think that acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs is the real ultimate epistemic goal (e.g. Foley), and others claim that epistemic rationality is valuable independently of knowledge and true belief (e.g. Kelly). Finally, some philosophers have argued that the sole ultimate epistemic value is understanding, rather than knowledge or true belief (e.g. Pritchard and Kvanvig).

The project aims to critically engage with this debate. The investigation should ideally find answers for the following five questions:
1) What epistemic values are there?
2) Are epistemic values intrinsically valuable or valuable because of their practical benefits? (Links with the problems of the pragmatic encroachment of epistemic notions, the debate on epistemic virtues and vices, and ethics of beliefs could be explored).
3) Are epistemic values subjective or objective?
4) Is there one ultimate epistemic value (monism), or more than one ultimate epistemic value (pluralism)?
5) What relations are there between ultimate and non-ultimate epistemic values (e.g. constitutive or instrumental)?

This post is being offered under the UK Government's Kickstart scheme, and as such is only open to those who are 24 or under, based int he UK, and currently on Universal Credit.

We are a fast-growing provider of online (and normally residential) courses for children, primarily homeschoolers but also for gifted children, which is the background from which this business originates. Our most popular course is philosophy, and we also offer courses in debating and improv. Our Director of Studies, Jason Buckley, is also a leading writer and teacher trainer in the field of philosophy for children (see www.thephilosophyman.com)

The successful candidate will have a wide range of duties spanning content development, marketing and, after training, assisting in the delivery of courses. You will also be involved in routine customer communications and all aspects of running the business.

For full details, see the job advert at this link: https://limber.work/job/462/. Also see what we do at www.p4he.org

3-year, full-time post-doc position in the Philosophy and Ethics department (Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Innovation Sciences) at on the general theme of “Opacity in Artificial Intelligence”. The successful applicant will join a strong team of philosophers who work on AI, in a group that focuses on technology, science and applied ethics.

Outline of the project:

In recent years, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in AI. One set of philosophical questions is due to the fact that AI systems often produce an output where it is not clear why this output was produced; the system is ‘opaque’ (non-transparent) to the subjects, users, and even to the makers of the system. This raises a large number of pressing research questions, including:
1) What, exactly, is opacity in AI? 2) What is the impact of opacity and what is its ethical relevance? 3) Should the impact of opacity be reduced? 4) Can the impact of opacity be reduced, e.g. through “explainable AI”? 5) Can we have data protection or unbiased systems if they are opaque? We welcome research projects on these or related issues.

The post-doc will work with Professor Vincent C. Müller and Assistant Professor Emily Sullivan; they will be part of a strong research group on the philosophy of AI and the philosophy of technology, generally. The Philosophy & Ethics department has recently hired four Assistant Professors and is advertising 3 PhD positions on similar themes together with this post-doc position. Our working language is English.

- Details on the official page -

At the same time we are also opening three fully-funded 4-year PhD positions on the themes of explainable AI, cognitive science, and philosophy of science/social epistemology. All applicants will be considered for all three positions.

PhD Position A: Norms of Explainable AI
PhD Position B: Cognitive Science of AI
PhD Position C: Philosophy of Science/Social epistemology

https://jobs.tue.nl/en/vacancy/three-phds-in-philosophy-philosophy-of-sc...

@TUeindhoven are looking for ethics lecturers, part-time but with very decent working conditions. Two different positions:

https://jobs.tue.nl/en/vacancy/one-lecturer-in-philosophy-869729.html

https://jobs.tue.nl/en/vacancy/-junior-lecturers-in-philosophy-869731.html

Department: https://research.tue.nl/en/organisations/philosophy-ethics/persons/